A Rationale of Criminal Negligence by Moreland, Roy Mitchell
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 1
1944
A Rationale of Criminal Negligence
Roy Mitchell Moreland
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moreland, Roy Mitchell (1944) "A Rationale of Criminal Negligence," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 32 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol32/iss3/1
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A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
(Continued from January Issue)
RoY MORELAND*
SECTION 9. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND
CRIMES BY OMISSION
When a crime is predicated upon an omission to act because
of negligence, the standard of care by which the defendant's
conduct is measured and the magnitude of risk required for
criminal liability are the same as in positive negligence. However,
a special problem is raised in such cases by the fact that it is
necessary to determine whether the defendant was under a legal
duty to act.
A. THERE MUST BE A LEGA DuTY TO ACT.
"A sees B drowning and is able to save him by holding out
his hand. A abstains from doing so in order that B may be
drowned, and he is drowned."' 3 7 - A has committed no offense.
* A.B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL.B., University of Ken-
tucky College of Law, 1923; J.D., University of Chicago Law School,
1928; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1942. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal
periodicals.
"'Stephen, op. cit. supra note 163, at 151, art. 212. "I am under
no legal obligation to protect a stranger. 'If I saw a man, who was
not under my charge, taking up a tumbler of poison, I should not be
guilty of any crime by not stoppmg him.' Nor by not warning a
blind man whom I saw heading for the edge of a cliff." Kenny, op. cit.
supra note 193,- at 137. "Negligence is a -word of abuse, and is often
-used by people without -fully comprehending its meaning. I may act
megligeritly, to mysd1f- and that may not give anyone else a cause of
complaint. It is only negligence that is the result of a'breach of duty
that comes before a tribunal." Rex v Murphy, 49 Ir. L. Times Rep.
15 (1914)
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One may have an abundance of wealth and yet let his neigh-
bor starve. He may stand idly by and watch his neighbor's child
who has strayed from its mother's care drown in a pail of water
without stretching out his hand. Dozens of illustrations, all
shocking to the moral sense, may be given. They point out that
an act may be a moral wrong and yet not a criminal offense. An
omission to perform an act of mercy is not indictable unless there
is a legal duty to act.
3 7 5
On the other hand, a sound public policy demands punish-
ment for some negligent acts of omission. Consequently, the law
has imposed a legal duty of care in a limited number of situa-
tions. Such duty may arise, (1) by relationship, (2) by contract,
or (3) by the act of taking charge.
1. Legal Dity Imposed by Relatwnslip.
A father who negligently withholds food or other necessaries
from his child when he has the means to supply them is criminally
liable.37 6 Although in a few cases, as in Stehr v. State,37 7 the
parent is charged with murder, the prosecution seldom attempts
to convict him of such crime, the offense charged usually being
involuntary manslaughter.
3 78
The mother is not liable for such omission unless it appears
that the food was supplied to her or was within her reach for
Lord Macauley, in his Report on the India Penal Code, discusses
this question at some length. He points out that there is much logic
and a great deal of common sense in the rule. Let us suppose that
A is accosted by a starving beggar. One dollar will save his life.
An additional dollar will save the life of his wife. Seven dollars will
save the lives of their five children also. And there are other beggars.
-How far should A's responsibility go? Why should it be placed upon
-him in the first place? "Thou art thy brother's keeper" is a good
moral rule, if not pressed too far. But it would be impossible and
highly impracticable to attempt to fully enforce its spirit in the
criminal law. See Lord Macauley's Report, reprinted in part, Whar-
ton, Homicide (2nd ed. 1875) at 50 et. seq.
r. "Desirable as the rule seems, that a parent be under a legally
enforceable duty to support his child, courts have been curiously un-
willing so to hold, even in cases of legitimate children. At common
law in England and in a few American states, this duty was con-
sidered merely moral, and not sufficient to bind the father to third
persons who furnished necessaries. Such a doctrine, however, was
too repugnant to a sense of justice to stand long, and in the great
majority of our jurisdictions the duty is now held to be legal." Note
(1923) 32 Yale L. J. 825.
192 Neb. 755, 139 N.W 676 (1913)
mAnnotation (1921) 10 A.L.R. 1137.
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that purpose. 37 9 The duty is placed upon the father as the head
of the household and the one responsible for its care and support.
In instances where the mother is the head of the household, she
becomes primarily responsible.
33 0
Since the obligation of the parent rests upon the duty of
care and support it does not continue after emancipation.
3 8 1
The difficult cases are those in which the parent does not
seek to evade his legal duty of care and support but attempts,
because of religious belief, to fulfill it in a way unsatisfactory to
the law.3s
2
In Commonwealth v Pierson3 ss the defendant and his wife
had adopted a female child less than two years of age. The child
became afflicted with whooping cough and later developed ca-
tarrhal pneumonia, dying within three days. The defendant
testified that for about forty-eight hours before the child died he
observed her symptoms were of a dangerous character, and yet
he did not call a physician, although he was financially able to
do so, because he believed in Divine healing, which could be
accomplished by prayer. The court held that although the de-
fendant loved his child and prayed for its life, his efforts did not
meet the objective standards of the criminal law. 38 4 He was
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
Although some courts have been reluctant to force parents
who were sincere in their religious belief to meet the standard
of the law, the case represents the prevailing rule. It is culpable
negligence for a father to fail to provide medical attention for
his child and it is the duty of the state to see that the parent
"If her husband supplied her with food for this child, and she
wilfully neglected to give it to the child, and thereby caused its death,
it might be murder in her. In these cases the wife is in the nature
of the servant of the husband. To charge her you must show that the
husband supplied her with food to give to the child, and that she
wilfully neglected to give it." Rex v Saunders, 7 Car. & P 277, 27a
(1836)
:Reg. v Edwards, 8 Car. & P 611 (1838)
""Reg. v Shepherd, 9 Cox C.C. 123 (1862)
'See Com. v Breth, 44 Pa. C.C. 56 (1915) student note on case;
Note (1916) 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev 88. Lee, Liability of Parent at
Common Law on Charge of Manslaughter for Negligently Omitting to
Furnish Medical Attendance to Child Because of Religious Disbelief in
the Efficacy of Medicine (1902) 55 Cent. L. J. 44.
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903)
' See last two paragraphs of fn. 135, supra-
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carries out his obligation. 3s The child is in no position to ap-
preciate its need in most cases or to secure medical attention if
it did, so it is the responsibility of the state in its interest in and
care over the young to enforce the law This should be done with
sympathy and tolerance where the parent is sincere in his belief.
but nevertheless with sufficient firmness to indicate unmistakably
that individuals must meet the objective standard which the law
demands in such cases.
A similar duty arising out of relationship is that of the hus-
band to support and care for his wife. This duty likewise is
founded upon his obligation as head of the household. There are
just a few cases involving an omission of this duty In State v
Smith,Us0 the wife of the defendant was insane and he left her
in a cold upper room with no fire and with only a piece of canvas
for a covering. She froze to death. He was held guilty of man-
slaughter.
Only one reported case of the conviction of a husband for
failure to provide medical attention for his wife has been found.
There is not as much reason for holding a husband liable in such
a case as a parent, since, while the husband is under a like dutyv,
a wife is usually of such mature years that she knows when she
needs a physician and of means by which she can obtain one. In
Westrup v CommonweaZth3 s 7 it was held that a husband was not
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in failing to procure medical
assistance for his wife during her confinement where it was shown
that this was due to the fact that she desired to manage the case
without the aid of a physician and that he secured one as soon
as he discovered her peril.
The leading case on the liability of a husband for failure to
care for his wife is Territory of Montava v Manton."ass The de-
fendant and his wife had been out drinking and carousing. On
the way home, the wife fell in the snow within easy calling dis-
tance of the house. Although he had a hired man living with him
who was willing to help bring her in, he left her there all night.
They brought her in the next morning but she languished speech-
Compare State v Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N.W 283 (1914)
and Bradley v State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920) where the courts
reached opposite results in construing similar statutes.
'65 Me. 257 (1876)
123 Ky 95, 93 S.W 646 (1906)
8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888)
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less for twenty-four hours and died. The husband was found
guilty of manslaughter. It was his duty, imposed by the marital
relationship, to help her into the house and to provide such care
as she needed. Neither his nor her drunkenness excused him from
the responsibility of fulfilling his obligation.
Suppose he had remained quietly at home that night, but,
while looking from the -window, had seen her fall m a drunken
stupor ' Would the fact that he had not participated in her deg-
radation excuse him from omitting to go to her rescue ' It is
submitted that it would have been his duty considering all the
circumstances, especially the severity of the weather, to bring
her in and to care for her. 3s 9
2. Legal Ditty Arising Out of Contract.
Generally, the breach of a contract is not -an indictable of-
fense. A civil action lies at law for the breach b'r in equity for
specific performance. But one may beconfe liable for man-
slaughter, or even murder, because of a failure, through negli-
gence, to perform his contractfial obligati6ns. 390 The rule has
"Reg. v. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. 600 (1844) can be distinguished.
I Sometimes the courts have failed to distinguish between an
omission to act and the negligent commission of an act. In Regma
v. Lowe,.3 Car. & K. 123 (1850), the defendant, who was an engineer,
'was hired- to manage a steam machine employed for the purpose of
drawing up miners from a coal pit. When the cart containing the men
arrived on a level with the mouth of the pit, it was his duty to stop
the revolution of the windlass so that the men could get out. He
deserted his post leaving the machine in charge of an ignorant boy
who protested his lack of knowledge of the workings of the machine.
The boy was unable to stop the machine on one of the trips and a
worker was killed. Lowe was held- guilty, of manslaughter. The
language of the court would indicate that this was considered as an
omission to act but it was not.- Lowe did an affirmative act in placing
.an ignorant boy in charge of the machine.
This distinction-is pointed out quite definitely in Hilton's Case, 2
Lewm C.C. 214 (1838). Hilton was indicted for manslaughter. It
was his duty to attend a steam engine. On the occasion m question
'he stopped the engine and negligently went away During his absence
an unskilled person came up, started -the engine, and was unable to
stop it again. In consequence of the machine being put in motion, the
deceased was killed. The court held that the death was the act of the
person who set the machine in motion after the defendant had neg-
ligently gone away It is necessary that the negligent act which causes
the death be that of the party charged. So in the Lowe Case. If
.Lowe had merely negligently gone away and left the engine, some-
one would have drawn the men out of the mine later. But he acted
by placing an incompetent boy in charge of the engine. It was not
his neglect of duty that made him liable criminally but this negligent
act.
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been consistently applied in the case of persons in charge of
machinery, railroad trains, appliances, vessels, and in the con-
duct of mines, 3 91 where a death has occurred as a consequence
of the omission of the defendant to carry out his contractual ob-
ligations.
Ordinarily, the neglect of duty results in the death of a
fellow employee or of a passenger traveling on the railroad or
other transportation system employing the defendant. Suppose,
however, that a member of the general public is injured because
of the omission to act 9
This problem is involved in Begmna v Smith.3 92 Smith's em-
ployer was the owner of a tramway which crossed a highway It
was the defendant's duty to give warning to any persons who
might be upon the highway when any of the employer's trucks
from his colliery might cross the road. The tramway was in
existence before the road and in the act by which the road was
made there was no clause imposing upon the employer the duty
of placing a watchman where the tramway crossed the highway
The deceased was killed by one of the trucks of the employer,
-while crossing the tramway The defendant, contrary to orders.
was absent at the time. So the injury occurred because of the
negligence of the defendant in omitting to perform his duties
under his contract of employment. Nevertheless, the court held
that there was no duty between the defendant and the public
since there was no duty in his employer to protect the public at
this point.
One finds himself dissatisfied with the decision. What deter-
mines whether there is a legal duty arising out of the contract
which will make the defendant criminally liable '
"'United States v Thompson, 12 Fed. 245 (1882) United States
v Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas. 800 (1864) State v Harrison, 107 N.J.L.
213, 152 Atl. 867 (1931) State v O'Brien, 32 N.J.L. 169 (1867), Clark
v State, 27 Okla. Cr. 11, 224 Pac. 738 (1924), Reg. v Spence, 1 Cox
C.C. 352 (1846)
Regina v Hughes, 7 Cox C.C. 301 (1857) is a typical case. The
deceased was working with others on a stage in a shaft which was
being walled. It was the duty of the defendant who was working at
the top of the shaft to send down bricks and materials in a bucket
and to draw up the empty bucket. He was supposed to see that a
stage was over the mouth of the shaft. He neglected to do this and a
bucket of bricks fell into the shaft killing the deceased. The jury
found that the, death occurred from the negligent omission of the de-
fendant to carry out his work. Lord Campbell held that he was
guilty of manslaughter.
' 11 Cox C.C. 210 (1869)
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In attempting to decide that question Rex v Pittwood3 93
should be considered in connection with the Smith Case. In the
Pittwood Case, the defendant was a gatekeeper at an accommo-
dation railroad. lte opened the gates, forgot to close them again,
and went to get some lunch. Ten minutes later the deceased was
crossing the track in a hay cart when a train came along and hit
the cart, killing him. It is apparent that there was no legal duty
in the employer to keep a watchman at this crossing. But the court
held Pittwood guilty of manslaughter. Mr. Justice Wright con-
sidered that the employer "had assumed the liability of protecting
the public whenever they crossed the road.'
3 94
It is submitted that the Pittwood Case overrules Regina v
Smith. The employer in the Pittwood Case would not be criminally
liable if he determined to take the guard off the crossing, notified
the public, and thereafter an accident occurred. So in a primary
sense there was never a duty owing to the public to guard this
crossing. It therefore follows that it is the contract alone and his
failure to carry it out that makes the watchman criminally liable.
The duty arose out of his contract.
There is at least one case like Rex v Pittwood in this country
In State v Harrsol,3 95 the defendant was employed by a rail-
road company as a gateman at a crossing. The gates were oper-
ated from a tower. Although warned by an electric device of the
approach of a train and knowing that the warning bell was out
of order, he failed to lower the gates as it was his duty to do
under the contract with the result that the decedent was hit and
killed. He was convicted of manslaughter. There were no statutes
involved imposing duty on the railroad to maintain a watchman
so far as can be discerned in the opiion. In the absence of
statute, ordinance, or some sort of official order, a railroad is
ordinarily under no duty to maintain a flagman or gate at a
crossing and negligence cannot be predicated upon a mere failure
to do so. The case is taken, therefore, as a declaration of the
common law on the subject.
There is one element in both of these cases not mentioned
in the decisions. This is the fact that although there was no duty
on the railroads to maintain gates or flagmen, they did so and
19 Times L. Rep. 37 (1902)
"
t Id. at 38.
107 N.J.L. 213, 152 Atl. 867 (1931)
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the public might have learned to rely upon them. Both the tower
in the Harrison Case and the gate il the Pittwood Case were in
view However, nothing is said of this point in either case and it
is not believed to be a necessary element in such cases. Let us
suppose that the gates and tower had not been erected. The watch-
man in each instance was to step out and wave a red flag in order
to warn the public. Suppose, further, that this was the first dav
the watchman had worked, the public had not yet learned to
rely on him. It is submitted the decision would be the same in
each of these hypothetical cases as it was in the original case.
The gates and the tower are not the deciding factors, the ratio
decidevdi in each instance is the duty arising out of the contract.
The decision in the Harrison Case -has been vigorouslv
criticised in a note.3 96 It is argued that in many of the cases
where an omission to act has been punished there has been a
hel-plessness created as a result of the contract that would not
have resulted but for the agreement. Thus, passengers on an
excursion steamer are lulled into a sense of security by their
belief that the master of the boat and regularly appointed in-
spectors have carried out their contractual duties to inspect life-
preservers and life-boats. In fact, most of them would not dare
take such a trip except for the known fact that such equipment
is supposed to be checked and inspected. They are helpless if the
contracts are not carried out.39 7
This element of "helplessness" is found in all of these de-
cisions in some form or other. But it need not be created becaiise
of or by the contract. X is under no duty to feed and care for Z,
a poor but worthy gentleman living on the other side of town.
Z is bed-ridden but too proud to ask for aid. X enters into a
contract with A by which A is to feed and care for the aged man.
A omits to fulfill his contract and Z dies. Z's helplessness is not
changed by the contract. And yet, it may well be argued that A
is guilty of manslaughter.
What is the basis of his liability 9 Although X is under no
legal duty to Z, may he not, as suggested in the Pittwood Case,
assume the duty if he desires 9 On the other hand, it is not neces-
' Note (1931) 11 Boston Umv L. Rev 273.
'7 U.S. v Van Shaick, 134 Fed. 592. See Stein v State, 37 Ala. 123
(1861) Note (1936) 25 Ky L. J. 103, 105.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND CRIMES BY OMISSION
sary that he assume any duty whatever in order to hold A. This
may be an act of pure mercy on the part of X and yet A is guilty
of manslaughter.
A entered into a contract having to do with human life and
safety He well knew the danger to human life if he failed to
carry out his contractual obligations. It is true that there was
no duty in his employer toward Z. But a respectable line of
authorities3 9S has held that A's liability does not rest upon any
duty of his employer toward the deceased. It arises out of his
contract. In such a case it is well to emphasize the fact that if
X had not obtained A he would have hired somebody else. So
Z's death is really due to A's omission. While the law may not
raise a legal duty in anyone to do an act of mercy in order to
aid Z, it may seize upon the contract in order to raise one. After
all, most obligations arising out of contract do not involve danger
to human life. When they do and the defendant has made the
contract with full knowledge of the danger, it may be in accord
with sound public policy to hold him criminally liable for his
omission to act. At least the trend of decisions is in that direction.
3. Duty Arzsnig Out of the Act of Taking Charge.
If one voluntarily assumes the care and custody of a human
being who, because of age, illness, or other Incapacity, is unable
to care for himself, omission to fulfill the responsibility so as-
sumed has been held to render one criminally liable, if the helpless
person dies as a result.
3 99
IState v Harrison, 107 N.J.L. 213, 152 Ati. 867 (1931) State
v. O'Brien, 32 N.J.L. 169 (1867), Rex v Pittwood, 19 Times L. Rep.
37 (1902)
May, op. cit. supra note 136, at 279.
"Every person under a legal duty, whether by contract or by
law, or by the act of taking charge, wrongfully or otherwise, of another
person, to provide the necessaries of life for such other person, is
criminally responsible if death is caused by the neglect of that duty
and if the person to whom the duty is owmg is, from age, health, m-
sanity, or any other cause, unable to withdraw himself from the control
of the person with whom it is due, but not otherwise." Stephen, op.
cit. supra note 163, at 151, art. 213.
The Restatement of Torts provides:
"Sec. 324. Duty of one who takes charge of another who is
helpless.
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of an-
other who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is
subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to
him by
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In Regina v Marrwtt,4 0 0 the defendant persuaded an aged
and infirm woman to live in his house and then left her in a cold
room without sufficient food and clothing, which caused her
death. He was convicted of manslaughter. The report of the
case is rather vague and unsiitisfactory but the testimony of
two witnesses indicates that he took the responsibility of the
care of the old lady under some sort of contract. 40 1
Stephen has taken out the contract element and suggested
a supposititious case based upon the other facts in the Marriott
Case raising a nice problem as to the duty of care arising out of
the act of taking charge. His supposititious case is as follows .402
"A persuades B, an aged and infirm woman, to live in his house,
and causes her death by neglecting to supply her properly with food
and fire, she being incapable of providing for herself from age and
infirmity"
Stephen would hold A criminally responsible for her death.
This is a fine illustration of a duty arising out of the act of taking
charge. The relationship was voluntarily entered into. The old
lady was in a position of extreme helplessness. If the defendant
had not volunteered his services, it is likely that some other in-
dividual would have taken charge of her and placed her where
she would not have been denied common comfort.
Since one owes no duty to play the good Samaritan by help-
ing strangers no matter how great their peril, the duty in such
cases must be assumed voluntarily In Regina v Shepherd,40 3 an
unmarried girl of eighteen who had been supporting herself by
.her own labor returned to the home of her mother and stepfather
to be *confined. The stepfather was away and the mother, having
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to
secure the safety of the other while within the actor's
charge;
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so
doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when
the actor took charge of him."
Note the comments and illustrations, Restatement, Torts, op. cit.
supra note 100, at 876-881.
As to the Tort rule, see also, Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others
as a Basis of Tort Liability (1908) 56 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 217, 316. See
Weymire v Wolfe, 52 Ia. 533, 3 N.W 541 (1879) Black v New York,
N. H. & H. R. Co., 193 Mass. 448, 79 N.E. 797 (1907), Depue v. Flatau,
100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W 1 (1907)
" 8 Car. & P 425 (1838)
... Id. at 433, fn. (a) See pp. 427 and 430 of the report.
0'Stephen, op. cit. supra note 163, at 152.
"'9 Cox C.C. 123 (1862)
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great ill-will toward her daughter because of her immoral acts
purposely neglected to procure a mid-wife and the daughter died
in childbirth. The court held that there was no legal duty in the
mother to secure the aid of a mid-wife.
It is submitted that the case, on its facts, reaches the correct
result. The daughter was emancipated and there was no duty
in the mother to procure aid. Many poor women have children
without the aid of mid-wives. Nor is it shown that she was able
to incur the expense. But, aside from these factors, it is not be-
lieved that the mother ever took charge of the care of this way-
ward daughter. The child born out of wedlock could bring only
shame and humiliation to the defendant. The daughter was an
unwelcome guest in her home. The mother was in no way re-
sponsible for the situation and instead of voluntarily making the
best of it and doing what she could for her daughter, as, perhaps,
she was under a moral duty to do, she assumed an antagonstic
attitude. She refrained quite vigorously from "taking
charge." 4
04
The rule under discussion applies in eases where the actor,
owing no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless
at the time the responsibility is assumed. 40 5 Suppose, however,
the incapacity develops subsequently ' A asks B to go with him
upon a hunting trip into an isolated section of Montana. They
will be thirty miles from the nearest settlement. B replies that
'Regina v. Nicholls, 13 Cox C.C. 75 (1874), is a difficult case.
A grandmother took an infant whose mother was dead, although not
bound by law to take care of it. Falling into bad circumstances, she
was obliged to go out to service during the day and placed the child
in the hands of a nine year old boy with instructions to look after it
but he failed to do so properly and the child died of starvation. She
was indicted for manslaughter. She could have sent the child to the
parish authorities but she had strong scruples against doing this. The
boy was too young to leave with the child. And she should have in-
vestigated to see that he was feeding the infant. However, the court
took the circumstances of the prisoner into consideration in determin-
ing that she was not guilty of gross negligence.
'" "The rule stated in this section is applicable to every case in
which the actor, owing no duty to do so, takes charge of another who
is at the time helpless adequately to care for himself. The most usual
situation to which it is applicable is that in which the actor gives his
services purely as a favor to the other. However, it is also applicable
to determine the liability of one who, for his own purposes and as a
necessary measure in the exercise of a privilege, takes charge of an-
other who is incapable of adequately protecting himself." (Italics
added). Restatement, Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 324, com-
ment f.
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he has been having attacks of appendicitis and is afraid to risk
it. A reassures him by promising that if an attack occurs, he will
get him to a doctor. The first morning after the pair arrive at
the hunting grounds B suffers an attack. A, without danger to
himself, can take him to a doctor. But, disregarding B's pleas,
A goes hunting. When he returns eight hours later, B is dead of
a ruptured appendix. Although A is not criminally liable under
the rule just stated because the incapacity developed subse-
quently, he can be held under another rule of law 40 He volun-
tarily undertook to look out for B with full knowledge of the
danger and of B's reliance upon him. The promise, though
gratuitous, led B in reasonable reliance upon its fulfillment to
undertake a course of conduct in which he would not otherwise
have engaged.
The courts have shown little inclination to extend the law
further. Assume that the facts in the hunting case, supra, are
changed somewhat. A and B, friends, go on a hunting trip into
an isolated region. Next morning B is deathly ill with an attack
of appendicitis. He asks A to take him to a doctor. Instead, A
goes hunting and, when he returns, B is dead with a ruptured
appendix. The relationship between the two friends is not suf-
ficient to raise a legal duty by operation of law, A did not take
charge of B because he was in good health when they left home,
and A made no gratuitous promise to cause B to enter
upon a course of conduct which was dangerous to his
safety unless the promise was carried out. In a ease like tis
the law will not hold A guilty unless it can be said that he should
have realized that his conduct would lead B to reasonably be-
lieve that the protection would be given in case of helplessness.40 7
" "One who gratuitously undertakes with another to do an act
or to render services which he should recognize as necessary to the
other's bodily safety and thereby leads the other m reasonable reliance
upon the performance of such undertaking
(a) to refrain from himself taking the necessary steps to secure
his safety or from securing the then available protective
action by third persons, or
(b) to enter upon a course of conduct which is dangerous un-
less the undertaking is carried out,
is subject to liability to the other for bodily harm resulting from the
actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to carry out his undertaking."
Id. at sec. 325. Prosser, Torts (1941) 196.
11 "The actor may undertake to do an act or to render services
either by an express promise to do so or by a course of conduct which
the actor should realize would lead the other into the reasonable belief
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In People v Beardsley °s the defendant's wife was tem-
porarily out of the city and he arranged with the deceased, a
woman of thirty, to go to his apartment with him. They knew
each other's habits and character. They spent the week-end to-
gether in a drunken, immoral debauch. On Monday afternoon
she took several grains of morphine, in his presence. Later he
had an attendant carry her to another room so she would not
be discovered in the apartment by his wife. Wfhen removed she
was in a stupor and died about nine o'clock that night without
medical attention. After a full discussion of the -authorities the
court held that the relation existing between a man and his
paramour is not sufficient to make him criminally liable for an
omission to act under the circumstances.
4 o
In State v Berry, et a14 10 three men, the deceased and the
two defendants, left Tres Piedras, New Mlexico, for Truchas, a
distance of nine miles, in a bobsled drawn by a team of horses.
It was a very cold night in January and all suffered from the
cold. According to the testimony of the defendants, the deceased,
who had been drinking, got off the sled several times and walked
behind in order to keep warm. Next morning his body was found
in the snow The indictment was framed upon the theory that
the defendants assaulted the deceased and ejected him from the
sled, leaving him wounded to freeze to death. The case was re-
versed on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to con-
vict. Aside from the insufficiency of the evidence, the court was
of the opinion that the defendants were not charged with an
omission to act under the indictment. However, the court, by way
of dictum, indicated that the duty which one owed to a fellow
traveler under such circumstances was moral and not legal.
These two cases, it is submitted, reach the proper result
under the existing law In neither case is there an antecedent
relationship such as parent and child, husband and wife, or master
that the act would be done or the services rendered." Restatement,
Torts, op. cit. supra note 100, at sec. 325, comment a.
150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W 1128 (1907)
' "Respondent had assumed either m fact or by implication no
care or control over his companion. Had this been a case where two
men under like circumstances had voluntarily gone on a debauch to-
gether, and one had attempted suicide, no one would claim that this
doctrine of legal duty could be invoked to hold the other criminally
responsible for omitting to make effort to rescue his companion." Id.
at 1131.
"436 N. Mex. 318, 14 P (2d) 434 (1932)
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and servant raising a duty of care and protection by operation
of law In neither case did the defendant promise that he would
take care of the other party if he became incapacitated. It may
also be doubted whether the defendants in these cases entered
upon a course of conduct which they should have realized would
lead their companions into the reasonable belief that they would
be taken care of if they became helpless.
4 11
It may be urged that it is just and socially expedient that
individuals under these or similar circumstances owe a legal duty
of care to each other because of their mutual dependence. The
association was voluntarily entered into by each with full knowl-
edge of the conditions they would face. On the other hand to
raise a duty of care and protection in such cases where there is
no relationship between the parties other than that they are
associates or companions would extend the rule of criminal lia-
bility to many new situations. Such extensions the criminal law,
as yet,412 refuses to recognize.
"See fn. 407, supra.
"2 On the general question see the discussion by Macauley in his
Notes to Draft of Indian Penal Code. Note N (Indian Penal Code, 1888
ed.), pp. 138 et seq., reprinted in part, Wharton, op. cit. supra note 375,
at 50 et seq.
The late Dean Ames suggested the following "possible working
rules"
"One who fails to interfere to save another from impending
death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or
no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great bodily harm
follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall be pumshed crun-
maly and shall make compensation to the party injured or to his
widow and children in case of death." Ames, Law and Morals
(1908) 22 Harv L. Rev 97, 113.
The Dutch Penal Code, art. 450, provides:
"He who, seeing another person suddenly threatened with the
danger of death, omits to give or furnish him with assistance,
which he can give or procure without any reasonable fear of
danger to himself or others, is punished, if the death of the person
in distress has resulted, with three months' imprisonment and
fine." Cited, Warner, Duty of a Railway Company to Care for a
Person It Has Without Fault Rendered Helpless (1919) 7 Cal. L.
Rev 312, 322. See also, 2 Livingstone, Complete Works on Crim-
rnal Jurisprudence (1873) 126-127, art. 484, reprinted Harno,
Cases on Criminal Law (1933) 96-97; Wechsler & Michael, supra
note 76, at 724-725.
PART III
STATUTORY REFORM IN THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
SECTION 1. NEGLIGENT MURDER STATUTES
A New York statute provides
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifi-
able, is murder in the first degree, when committed:
"2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a pre-
meditated design to effect the death of any individual; ""3
The phraseology employed in this act is similar to that
commonly adopted in other jurisdictions where state legislatures
have attempted to describe the type of conduct requisite for the
negligent murder. The same language is found in the Washing-
ton code4 14 and, as m New York, the offense is first degree mur-
der. A similar statute in Alabama,41 5 however, substitutes the
word greatly for nnmsnently. The wording in the New York
statute is found m the Florida,4 10 Oregon,4 17 and Wisconsin 4ls
codes, where the crime is murder in the second degree. In Minne-
sota,4 19 it is murder in the third degree. In Mississippl, 420 North
Dakota,4 21 Oklahoma,4 2 2 and South Dakota 4 23 the offense is
designated simply as murder, since in these jurisdictions, as at
common law, the crime is not divided into degrees.
In nine states, Arkansas, 42 4 Arizona,4 25 California,
4 26
Georgia,4 27 Idaho,4 28 Illinois, 4 29 Montana,4 30 and Nevada, 4 31
" Laws of N.Y. (Thompson, 1939) (Penal) sec. 1044.
... Rev Stat. Wash. (Remington, 1932) sec. 2392.
".Ala. Criminal Code (1923) sec. 4454
"18 Comp. Gen. Laws Fla. (1927) sec. 7137.
47 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) sec. 23-403.
"3 Wis. Stat. (1932) sec. 340.03.
"'Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) sec. 10070.
'= Miss. Code (1930) chap. 20, sec. 985.
Comp. Laws N. D. (1913) sec. 9462.
"-Okla. Stat. (1931) sec. 2216.
4"Comp. Laws S. D. (1929) sec. 4012.
'-' Dig. Stat. Ark. (Pope, 1937) secs. 2964, 2967.
"=Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) sec. 43-2901.
" Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1937) secs. 187, 188.
'"Ann. Code Ga. (Park, 1914) (Penal) secs. 60, 62.
'SIdaho Code Ann. (1932) secs. 17-1101, 17-1102.
Ill. Rev Stat. (1937) chap. 38, sec. 358.
"Rev Code Mont. (1935) secs. 10953, 10954.
" Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) secs. 10066, 10068.
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the language employed in the negligent murder statute bears
unmistakable kinship to the terminology of the one in New
York, although the wording is different. The provision in the
California code43 2 is typical
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice
aforethought. Such malice may be express or implied.
It is implied when the circumstances show an abandoned
and malignant heart."
It will be noted that the descriptive phrase, "by an act
imminently dangerous to others," has been eliminated in this
statute and it is provided that the circumstances must indicate
"an abandoned and malignant heart" rather than "a depraved
mind" as in the New York code.
43 3
Three jurisdictions, Colorado,4 34 New M exico,4 3  and
Utah,4 36 must be placed in a separate category The code pro-
visions in these states combine all the above phrases. For ex-
ample, the New Mexico code provides
"Malice shall be implied when all the circumstances
show a wicked and malignant heart. All murder which shall
be perpetrated. by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of
others, and indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life,
shall be deemed murder in the first degree.
No attempt has been made by the legislatures of the re-
maining twenty six states to describe the characteristics of the
actor or the type of conduct required for the negligent murder.
In fourteen states, Connecticut,4 3  Delaware, 4 38 Mlaryland,4 3"9
Mlassachusetts,
4 4 0 Michigan,
4 4 i Missouri, 4 4
2 New Hampshire 4 4 3
New Jersey,4 44  North Carolina, 4 4.5 Pennsylvania, 44 6 Rhode
Island,44- 7 Vermont, 44 s Virginia, 4 9 and West Virginia 4 50 the
4 Cal. Penal Code (Deermg, 1937) secs. 187, 188.
"Supra, n. 413.
"'Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) chap. 48, secs. 30, 32.
"New Mex. Stat. Ann. (1929) secs. 35-303, 35-304.
"Rev Stat. Utah (1933) secs. 103-28-2, 103-28-3.
" Gen. Stat. Conn. (1930) sec. 6043.
"Rev Code Del. (1935) sec. 5158.
' Ann. Code Md. (Bagby 1924) art. 27, sec. 401.
1,0 Gen. Laws Mass. (1932) chap. 265, sec. 1.
... Comp. Laws Mich. (1929) sec. 16709.
"'Rev Stat. Mo. (1929) sec. 3983.
"' Pub. Laws N.H. (1926) chap. 392, sec. 1.
"'Rev Stat. N. J. (1937) sec. 2-138-2.
; N.C. Code Ann. (1939) sec. 4200.
"'Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18, sec. 2221.
"' Gen. Laws R.I. (1938) chap. 606, sec. 1.
"'Pub. Laws Vt. (1933) sec. 8374.
"Va. Code Ann. (1936) sec. 4393.
W Va. Code Ann. (1937) sec. 5916.
NEGLIGENT MURDER STATUTES
statutes provide that certain named killings shall be murder in
the first degree and then conclude generally, "All other kinds of
murder shall be murder in the second degree." In these jurisdic-
tions the tests for the negligent murder are the same as they
were at common law,4 51 and this is true, also, in four additional
states, Iowa,4 52 Mlaine,4 53 South Carolina,
45 4 and Tennessee, 4 55
whose statutes provide, "'Whoever kills any human being with
malice aforethought, either express or implied. is guilty of mur
der. "
No statutes covering the negligent murder have been found
in the eight remaining states. 45 G In those jurisdictions the offense
is punished as a common law crine, except in those states where
common law crimes have been abolished.
4 57
All the statutes in effect in the twenty-two jurisdictions
which have attempted to describe the type of actor and the con-
duct required in the case of the negligent murder are attempted
codifications of the common law They are therefore subject to
the criticisms commonly leveled at the common law definitions
of the offense. The phrases used do not describe either the crime
or the actor with sufficient certainty 45s They are picturesque but
.iot satisfying; all are ambiguous. If a choice must be made be-
tween them, perhaps the statutes in Colorado, New ilexico. and
Utal 45 9 are the most satisfactory They have substituted the
word greatly for u m nently, a word which does not ordinarily
carry the connotation intended in the New York statute. 0 0
,' See the discussion and commentaries, Report of Law Rev Com.,
N.Y., op. cit. supra note 4, at 617-626.
"Iowa Code (1939) sec. 12910.
" Rev. Stat. Me. (1930) chap. 129, sec. 1.
*' Code Laws S.C. (1932) sec. 1101.
* Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) sec. 10767.
These states are Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming.
11 It appears that common law crimes have been abolished m
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas. See Hall
and Glueck, op. cit. supra note 253, at 49. For the situation in Texas,
see Note (1939) 27 Ky. L. J. 338 and Banks v State, 85 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 165, 211 S.W 217 (1919), Cockrell v State, 135 Tex. Crim. Rep.
218, 117 S.W (2d) 1105 (1938) As to Kentucky see Brown v Com.,
13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W 220 (1891)
"See the discussion,. supra pp. 139-155; also, Report of Law Rev
Com., N.Y., op. cit. supra note 4, at 617-646.
"Fns. 434, 435, and 436, supra.
11 Imminent ordinarily means threatening to happen at once; close
at hand. Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1937)
Roget's Thesaurus (1937 Am. ed.)
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Any attempt to define the negligence requisite for murder
involves a description of the state of mind and the degree of
risk required for liability 461 Evidently, the legislatures in New
Mexico and Utah and in the eleven jurisdictions represented by
the statute in New York understood this, since the statutes in
these states meet these requirements. If, then, these statutes are
fundamentally sound and are to be criticised largely because they
are not sufficiently clear, the question arises whether a more
satisfactory statute can be drawn.
Such a task is not an easy one. It is difficult to deal conciselv
with a concept as evasive as the negligent murder. It is believed,
however, that the following statute, which is based upon the
conclusions in this study as to the offense, 4 62 is more satisfactory
than existing legislative efforts
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable,
is murder m the second degree, when committed:
"2. By an act extremely dangerous to others, and evincing, if
the actor has knowledge of the danger, a wanton disregard for human
life and safety"
This statute is clearer than existing code provisions in several
respects. It would seem that the word "extremely" describes the
very high degree of dangerous conduct requisite for murder better
than "imminently" or "greatly " The requirement that the
actor have actual knowledge of the danger is plainly stated. The
picturesque but ambiguous phrases commonly used to describe
the state of mind required for liability have been replaced by
the less colorful but more easily interpreted, "wanton disregard
for human life and safety " This phrase seems better suited to
describe the type of arrogant recklessness which characterizes
the particularly reprehensible conduct punished as negligent
murder. The statute punishes the offense as murder in the second
degree, the rule in most jurisdictions.
SECTION 2. NEGLIGENT TMAlNSLAUGHTER
STATUTES
The code provision in New York is typical of a number of
negligent manslaughter statutes. It provides .463
"'See p. 139, et seq., supra.
"' Ibid.
"Laws of N.Y. (Thompson, 1939) (Penal) sec. 1052.
NEGLIGENT MAISLAUGHTER STATUTES
" homicide is manslaughter in the second degree, when com-
mitted without a design to effect death:
"3. By (the) culpable negligence of any person, which,
according to the provisions of this article, does not constitute the
crime of murder in the first or second degree, nor manslaughter in
the first degree."
Five states, Minnesota, 4 64 New Hampshire,4 65 North Da-
kota,4 6 6 Oklahoma, 4 6 7 and South Dakota, 4 6 8  have parallel
statutes. Three jurisdictions, Florida,4 60 MVississipp, 4 70 and
Missouri 4 7 1 have similar code provisions but provide simply that
the offense is manslaughter.
Various applications of the common law distinction between
lawful and unlawful acts appear in the manslaughter statutes of
twenty states. Involuntary manslaughter at common law em-
braced two closely related, not always distinguishable concepts.
The first was that of an unintentional killing resulting from the
doing of a lawful act, but without due caution and circumspec-
tion. The second and closely allied conception was that of an
unintended homicide resulting from the doing of an unlawful
act which was not a felony 472 Both principles are interpreted
as requiring an act dangerous to life or limb, so there is an over-
lap in their application.
Both concepts are incorporated in the statutes in Arizona, 4 73
California,4 7 4  Idaho,4 75  Montana,4 7 6 New Mexico, 4 7 7  and
Utah,4 78 each of which provides substantially as follows
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of two kinds, involuntary, in the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a law-
ful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner, or without
due caution and circumspection."''
'" Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) sec. 10078.
"Pub. Laws N.H. (1926) chap. 392, sec. 9.
' Comp. Laws N.D. (1913) sec. 9491.
Okla. Stat. (1931) sec. 2228. See pp. 13-14 supra.
''Comp. Laws S.D. (1929) sec. 4024.
'' Comp. Gen. Laws Fla. (1927) sec. 7141.
0 Miss. Code (1930) chap. 20, sec. 1002.
'Rev. Stat. Mo. (1929) sec. 3988.
' - 1 East, op. cit. supra note 29, at 255-271, Foster, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 258-265.
'Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) sec. 43-2904.
" Cal. Penal Code (Deermg, 1937) sec. 192.
11 Idaho Code Ann. (1932) sec. 17-1106.
"7 Rev. Code Mont. (1935) sec. 10959.
'New Mex. Stat. Ann. (1929) sec. 35-305.
"'Rev. Stat. Utah (1933) sec. 103-28-5.
" This is the phraseology in the Arizona code, n. 473, supra.
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The Oregon statute4sO likewise incorporates both the lawful
and unlawful act concepts but omits the phrase, "not amounting
to a felony " A similar but ambiguous statute in Arkansas
48
also omits this phrase. substituting "without the means calculated
to produce death." In Colorado, 4s 2 Georgia.4 8 3 Illinos. 48 4 and
Nevada,48 5 the phrase, "which might produce such conse-
quences," has been substituted for "without due caution and
circumspection." The statutes in these jurisdictions also contain
the ambiguous qualification that where the killing occurs in the
commission of an unlawful act "which in its consequences natu-
rally tends to destroy the life of a human being, it is murder."
Such a limitation should be incorporated in the negligent murder
provisions rather than in the one relating to involuntary man-
slaughter.
Kansas4sG and Wiseonsn 4sT have parallel ambiguous stat-
utes providing that the killing of a human being by the "culpable
negligence" of another while the other is engaged m the perpe-
tration or attempt to perpetrate any crime or misdemeanor not
amounting to a felony, "where such killing would be murder at
common law," is manslaughter in the first degree. A carelessly
drawn statute In Wyoming 48 8 provides that an imintentional
homicide in the commission of an unlawful act or by culpable
negligence or criminal carelessness is manslaughter.
In three jurisdictions, Indiana,48 9 Nebraska,400 and Ten-
nessee. 4 91 the code provides simply that the killing of a human
being "in the commission of some unlawful act" is involuntary
manslaughter. The phrase "unlawful act" in these statutes is
interpreted to include criminal-negligence. 4 92  -
"' Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) see. 23-406.
"' Dig. Stat. Ark. (Pope, 1937) sec. 2982.
412 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) chap. 48, sec. 36.
'SAnn. Code Ga. (Park, 1914) (Penal) sec. 67.
's' Ill. Rev Stat. (1937) chap. 38, sec. 363.
4':Nev Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 10072.
"Rev Stat. Kan. (1923) sec. 21-407.
"Wis. Stat. (1939) sec. 340.10.
"Wyo. Rev Stat. (1931) sec. 32-205.
"Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) sec. 10-3405.
"' Comp. Laws Neb. (1929) see. 28-403.
"' Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) sec. 10774.
"'-State v Dorsey 118. Ind. 167, 20 N.E. 777 (1889) Minardo v.
State, 204 Ind. 422, 183 N.E. 548 (1923) Benton v State, 124 Nev 485,
247 N.W 21 (1933) Copeland v State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W 565
(1926), Hiller v. State, 164 Tenn. 388, 50 S.W (2d) 225 (1932)
NEGLIGENT -\IANSL iUGHTER STSTUTES
Texas abolished the statutory offense of manslaughter in
1927 ;493 since that time there have been two grades of "negligent
homicide," corresponding approximately to involuntary man-
slaughter in that jurisdiction, based upon whether the killing oc
curred in the commission of an unlawful or a lawful act.4 94 A
statute4 95 provides that the tort standard of care shall be used
in determining whether the defendant is guilty of a negligent
homicide under these code provisions.
In Alabama,4 96  Connecticut,4 ' 7, Delaware,
49 s Iowa,4091
Maryland, 50 0  Mlassachusetts, 50 1 MANichigan, 502 New Jersev 50:'
North Carolina, 50°  Ohio,5 05 Pennsylvania, 50 6 Rhode Island,50 7
South Carolina, 50 8 Vermont, 50 9 Virginia, 5 10 Washington,51 1
and West Virgna 5 12 manslaughter is not defined, the code simply
fixes the punishment for the offense. klaie 51 3 punishes man-
slaughter "as defined at the common law " Kentucky has no
involuntary manslaughter statute, the negligent manslaughter
is punished in that jurisdiction as a common law offense of in-
voluntary manslaughter and also as voluntarv manslaughter
under the voluntary manslaughter statute. The decisions in this
jurisdiction are in confusion, apparently, gross negligence in
handling a gun or an automobile makes a killing voluntary man-
slaughter,5 14 all other negligent manslaughter being involuntary,
a..illogical and unsupported distinction.
' Reisenfeld, op. cit. supra note 31, fn. 5.
°' Penal Code Tex. (Vernon, 1936) secs. 1230, 1231, 1238.
Id. at sec. 1233.
' Ala. Crum. Code (1923) sec. 4460.
Gen. Stat. Conn. (1930) sec. 6046.
"'Rev Code Del. (1935) sec. 5161.
Iowa Code (1939) Sec. 12919.
'Ann. Code Md. (Bagby 1924) art. 27, sec. 354.
' Gen. Laws Mass. (1932) chap. 265, sec. 13.
Comp. Laws Mich. (1929) sec. 16717.
'Rev Stat. N.J. (1937) sec. 2-138-5.
"'N.C. Code Ann. (1939) sec. 4201.
' Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1939) sec. 12404.
'Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18, sec. 2226.
' Gen. Laws R.I. (1938) chap. 606, sec. 3.
Code Laws S.C. (1932) sec. 1107.
'Pub. Laws Vt. (1933) sec. 8377.
'0 Va. Code Ann. (1936) sec. 4397.
"Rev Stat. Wash. (Remington, 1932) sec. 2395.
'W Va. Code Ann. (1937) sec. 5920.
"Rev. Stat. Me. (1930) chap. 129, sec. 2. The statute also specifi-
cally provides that it is manslaughter to negligently omit to act where
there is a legal duty to do so." May, op. cit. supra note 136, at 272, fn. 46. See Held v. Com.,
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It is apparent that none of these statutes describes the kind
of conduct requisite for the negligent manslaughter with any
degree of precision. Tag phrases, such as "culpable negligence,"
"lawful act without due caution and circumspection," and "un-
lawful act not amounting to a felony" are vague and meaning-
less. The courts have done little better in interpreting what they
mean. The stock descriptive phrase found in the decisions is, of
course, "gross negligence." 5 15 But neither this phrase nor the
equally nebulous supplemental ones used by judges describe such
conduct with clarity
Admittedly, it is not an easy task to draft a serviceable
negligent manslaughter statute. As in the case of the negligent
murder, it is difficult to deal so concisely with such an evasive
problem as the character of negligence required for manslaughter.
It is believed, however, that the following statute, which in-
corporates the findings in this study as to the offense, 5 16 offers a
reasonably satisfactory solution to the problem.
" Homicide is manslaughter in the second degree, when
committed without a design to effect death:
"2. By the criminal negligence of any person, which according to
the provisions of this article does not constitute the crine of murder
in the second degree. Criminal negligence as used in this provision
means conduct creating such an unreasonable risk to human life and
safety as to be recklessly disregardful of such interests. The standard
of conduct to be applied is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances."
This statute is much clearer than existing code provisions.
It brings to the surface the two most important problems in
criminal negligence. The first of these has to do with the kind
of standard which shall be employed in determining criminal
negligence in the case of manslaughter. As to this the statute
provides that the "conduct of a reasonable man under like
circumstances" is the standard to be applied in determining
liability This is a clear adoption of the prevailing objective
standard.517
183 Ky 209, 208 S.W 772 (1919) Jones v. Com., 213 Ky 356, 281 S.W
164 (1926)
11 See the discussion, supra, p. 9. Cf. Oklahoma, pp. 13-14 supra.
"Culpable negligence are the terms frequently used, and are less
open to objection. But I will tell you that what the prisoner must
be found guilty of is gross negligence." O'Brien, J., in Reg. v. Elliott,
16 Cox C.C. 710, 714.
See the discussion, supra, pp. 31-41, 127-139.
See the discussion, supra, pp. 34-41.
STATUTORY OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT Ho icIDE
The second problem has to do with the degree of negligence
required for conviction. This question presents greater difficulties
to the codifier. The statute provides that this degree is reached
when the conduct of the accused creates "such an unreasonable
risk of danger as to be recklessly disregardful of human life and
safety "This description makes the required degree of negligence
synonymous with "recklessness," the word which most nearly
describes it.51S
SECTION 3. THE STATUTORY OFFENSE OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
In 1921 Michigan enacted a statute destined to have consid-
erable effect on the law of criminal negligence. This statute,5 19
creating the separate offense of negligent homicide committed
in the operation of any vehicle, provided :520
"Section 1. Every person who, by the operation of any vehicle
at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent
manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another,
shall be guilty of the crime -of negligent homicide and upon conviction
shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars,
or to undergo imprisonment in the state prison for a period not ex-
ceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the dis-
cretion of the court.
"Section 2. The crime of negligent homicide shall be deemed
to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to have
been committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the jury shall find
the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter such jury may
in its discretion render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide.
"Section 3. In any prosecution under this act, whether the de-
fendant was driving at an immoderate rate of speed shall be a question
of fact for the 3ury and shall not depend upon the rate of speed fixed
by law for operating such vehicle."
Vermont passed a similar statute in 1925.521 It provides a
punishment of five years imprisonment, $2,000 fine, or both for
death resulting from the "careless or negligent operation of a
motor vehicle," and that the section shall not be construed "to
limit or restrict prosecutions for manslaughter." New Hampshire
passed a like statute in 1931,522 substituting, however, "reckless"
for "careless or negligent" and limiting the fine to $1,000, as in
See the discussion, pp. 128-137.
Comp. Laws Mich. (1929) secs. 16743-16745.
The words, "shall be a question of fact for the jury" in section
3 should be omitted in order to prevent the section from being un-
constitutional. People v McMurchy 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W 723
(1930).
'Pub. Laws Vt. (1933) sec. 5152.
'N. H. Laws (1931) (Special Session, 1930) chap. 81, sec. 2.
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the Michigan statute. A Louisiana523 act adopted in 1930 names
the offense "involuntaryl homicide" and provides a punishment
of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years where the
vehicle is operated in a "grossly negligent or grossly reckless
manner."
New Jersey 2 4 enacted a statute in 1935 making homicide
through the "careless" operation of a motor vehicle a mis-
demeanor. There is no reference to manslaughter in the statute.
Ohio5 25 modified the manslaughter statute in 1935 so as to make
an unintentional killing resulting from the unlawful use of the
highway manslaughter in the second degree punishable by a fine
not to exceed $500 or imprisonment in the county jail or work-
house not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or im-
prisonment in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than
twenty years. A California amendment52 6 to the Vehicle Code,
enacted in 1935, provides that a death resulting from the driving
of any vehicle in a "negligent manner" shall constitute a felony
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year or in the state prison for not more than three years. The
offense is designated "Negligent Homicide." New York5
2 7
passed a statute in 1936 providing that a person who commits a
killing while engaged in the "reckless or culpably negligent"
operation of a vehicle is guilty of criminal negligence and pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or by
a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.
These statutes52 s raise several questions. What is the pur-
pose of such legislation 9 What is the relation of the new offense
to other crimes in the jurisdiction involving an unintentional
killing by negligence I What is the standard of care to be applied
in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offense de-
scribed in the statute
:"La. Code Crim. Proc. (Dart, 1932) secs. 1047, 1049.
-,"'Rev Stat. N. J. (1937) sec. 2:138-9. The distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors is ignored in New Jersey and misdemeanors
are often more serious offenses than in other jurisdictions. See
Jackson v State, 49 N.J.L. 252, 9 Atl. 741 (1887)
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) sec. 12404-1.
5 Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1937) sec. 500.
'Laws N. Y. (Thompson, 1939) secs. 1053-a, 1053-b.
" See, also, Supp. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1931, 1933, 1935) sec. 1685c;
Comp. Stat. Neb. (1929) sec. 39-1106; Wyo. Rev Stat. Ann. (1931)
sec. 72-128.
STATUTORY OFFENSE OF NLEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
The purpose of such statutes is not altogether clear, although
it is supposed to be a legislative attempt to provide for convictions
in situations where juries refuse to convict of manslaughter. Pro-
fessor Riesenfeld, in an excellent discussion of such legislation,
529
points out that there is a popular feeling that manslaughter is
not the proper label for a considerable number of cases of man-
slaughter committed through violation of traffic rules. The term
itself carries a connotation, it is believed, which is too harsh to
apply to such cases and the punishment provided in ordinary
manslaughter statutes is too severe.
This legislative purpose, "to get more convictions," is indi-
cated by the fact that in most jurisdictions the new offense and
manslaughter overlap. In other words, the jury has an election to
convict of either involuntary manslaughter or of negligent homi-
cide, a lesser offense, the standard of care as to both crimes being
"gross negligence." It appears that this is the situation in
Louisiana5 3 ° and yoming5 3 1 and probably in Nebraska, 2
New Hampslire,5' 3 and Vermont.534  It is the situation in
Canada.5 35
While the original statute in Michigan was also passed to
secure additional convictions, it was because of a reason other
than the failure of juries to apply the manslaughter statute. The
appellate court of Mlichigan has adopted a very loose and illogical
definition of the negligence requisite for manslaughter. In the
leading case of People v Barlnes,5 36 the court set aside a con-
viction of manslaughter, saying
"In this case, in order to warrant the conviction of the respondent,
it should have clearly appeared that Mary Robb's death ensued as a
direct and natural result of the reckless or gross negligence of the
respondent. The crime sought to be proven was involuntary homi-
cide, caused by culpable negligence, and, to make an act carelessly
performed resulting in death a criminal one, the carelessness must
have been gross, implying an mdifference to consequences; and the
term 'gross negligence' means something more than mere negligence.
Riesenfeld, op. cit. supra note 31, at 8. See, also, an excellent
article, Tincher, Proposed Statutory Reform in the Law of Negligent
Homicide in Kentucky (1942) 30 Ky L. J. 341.
'State v Flattmann, 172 La. 620, 135 So. 3 (1931)
"t See State v McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526 (1925)
'See Riesenfeld, op. cit. supra note 31, at 16.
SIdem.
Idem.
Rex v. Kennedy, 2 D.L.R. 448 (1936), Rex v Preusantanz, 2
D.L.R. 421 (1936)
182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W 400 (1914)
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It means wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may
ensue, and indifference to the rights of others that is equivalent to a
criminal intent."'
This decision indicates a lack of knowledge of the qualities of
"gross negligence." Criminal negligence is never the equivalent
of criminal intent. A negligent act may be punished as severely
as an intentional one, and frequently is, but negligence is always
something different in kind from intention. 53 8
It was felt that the definition left unpunished many negligent
homicides of less culpability than those included in the definition,
but which, nevertheless, should be pumshed.5 39 It would appear
that situations along the lower fringe of what is called gross negli-
gence in other jurisdictions are not covered by the involuntary
manslaughter statute under the court's definition of gross negli-
gence. It is believed that the Michigan negligent homicide statute
was passed to remedy this defect and thus effect coverage of the
field covered in other jurisdictions by a broader, more rational
definition of gross negligence. This position is strengthened by
the fact that the new statute uses the word "reckless" to describe
the conduct requisite for conviction, a word ordinarily used in
describing the negligence requisite for manslaughter, and that
section two of the act provides that the new offense is included in
the crime of manslaughter.
However, the appellate court, in construing the new stat-
ute,5 40 held that it applies only where the negligence is less than
gross. The net result is that the statute is construed to cover kill-
ings in the operation of a vehicle resulting from ordinary negli-
gence. The statute therefore enlarges the ground covered by the
manslaughter statute and goes so far as to apply the standard of
-are in civil cases to situations coming within it. The question
now arises whether, strictly speaking, situations along the lower
fringe of what is called gross negligence in other jurisdictions
are covered by either statute under the court's constructions.
Id. at 406-407.
See the discussion and analysis, supra, p. 151.
This is not a necessary conclusion, since the word "reckless"
appears in the court's definition in the alternative and this word is
commonly considered to be sufficiently descriptive of the whole field
of conduct in the negligent manslaughter. The ambiguity could have
been cleared up in a subsequent decision of the court without over-
ruling the decision m People v Barnes.
1* "By the enactment of this statute, the Legislature of 1921
obviously intended to create a lesser offense than involuntary man-
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It has been decided in California also that ordinary negli-
gence is sufficient to support a conviction under the negligent
honcide statute.541 This conclusion is not surprising in that
state in view of the wording of the statute, which provides for
puishment where a killing results from the driving of a vehicle
"in a negligent manner." The court reasons that it was the pur
pose of the legislature to create a crime different from that pro-
vided for in the definition of manslaughter. Since the standard
of care in the case of manslaughter is gross negligence, the court
concludes that the legislature intended that ordinary negligence
should be sufficient under the new statute.
54 2
The new Ohio statute54 3 enlarges the ground covered by the
ordinary manslaughter statute in that state but the result is ob-
tained in a different way The new statute creates the crime of
manslaughter in the second degree, a special lesser degree of
manslaughter.
5 4 4
It would appear that the New York statute54 5 does not en-
large the ground covered by the statutes defining manslaughter
in the first and second degree since it merely creates a special
offense of less culpability and with less punishment. The new
statute will almost certainly be interpreted to require gross negli-
gence since it requires "reckless or culpably negligent" con-
duet5 40 resulting in giving the jury an election to hold the accused
for second degree manslaughter or the new offense, if the indict-
slaughter or common law negligent homicide, where the negligent
killing was caused by the operation of a vehicle. To do this it eliminated
as necessary elements of the lesser offense negligence classed as
wanton or willful. Included in these terms is gross negligence. So
that, in the enactment of the statute, there was expressly eliminated
as elements of the crime all negligence of such character as to evidence
a criminal intent; and, as we have before pointed out, wanton or willful
or gross negligence was of that character. Therefore this statute
was intended to apply only to cases where the negligence is of a
lesser degree than gross negligence." People v Campbell, 237 Mich.
424, 428, 212 N.W 97, 99 (1927)
"1People v. Warner, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 190, 80 P (2d) 737 (1938).
"Accord, People v Pociask, - Cal. App. (2d) - 96 P (2d)
788 (1939), People v Beckhard, - Cal. App. - 93 P (2d) 158
(1939)
s"See page 244, supra.
" In connection with the two manslaughter statutes in Ohio see
Note (1938) 4 Ohio St. L. J. 234.
" See page 244, supra.
"46So held in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department, in People v Sackett, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 748 (1942)
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ment is properly framed. Consequently, no new ground is added
by the statute.
Aliat conclusion is to be drawn from an examination of
these statutes ' It appears that the motivating force behind such
legislation is to secure additional convictions. Various factors
have contributed to this need. In some instances it has been felt
that the manslaughter label is too harsh, that juries would con-
vict in such cases if the offense had a less atrocious name, or a
less severe punishnient. In Michigan, the statute was enacted
because the judicial definition of manslaughter was too narrow to
include a number of such cases which it was felt should be pun-
ished. In California, the legislature apparently intended to
extend criminal liability to cases where death results from ordi-
nary negligence in the operation of a vehicle.
Such legislation is still in the transition stage. It is impossi-
ble to prophesy how popular it will be or its final form. It does
appear, however, that if juries in California show a reluctance
to convict of manslaughter where gross negligence is the standard,
they will show an even greater reluctance to convict of negligent
homicide with ordinary negligence as the standard. 54 7 Ordinary
negligence as a basis for criminal liability has gained little head-
way in our law, except in Texas.54s
Nor does it appear that anything has been gained by chang-
mg the name of the offense. The phrase "negligent homicide" is
just as harsh a label as "negligent manslaughter." On the other
hand, while the maximum punishment for the new offense is
usually as severe as the minimum punishment for manslaughter,
the minimum punishment is less. Perhaps that is the most im-
portant factor in such statutes.
It would appear that the New York statute points the way
such legislation will go. The harsh label has been removed as far
as possible, the offense is simply described with particularity as
"criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in
death. "59 The maximum punishment is five years, whereas ii
the case of manslaughter in the second degree, it is fifteen.550 It
51 Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1937) sec. 500.-,"See the discussion, supra, pp. 10-11.
"Laws N.Y. (Thompson, 1939) sec. 1053-a.
Laws N.Y. (Thompson, 1939) sec. 1053-b.
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may be that more convictions can be secured under such a statute.
However, it is altogether possible that there is a fundamental
feeling on the part of juries that one should not be convicted of a
killing resulting from a negligent violation of a road law, except
in such a flagrant case that a conviction of manslaughter is
justifiable. 55 1
"At least two states have refused to enact such statutes. See
Riesenfeld, op. cit. supra note 31, at 6 and State v Whatley, 210 Wis.
157, 161, 162, 245 N.W 93, 95, 99 A.L.R. 749, 752 (1932)
PART IV
CONCLUSION
As this study of criminal negligence has progressed, it has
become clear that the drafting of a formula for the offense mn-
volves the determination of two fundamental questions.
First, a decision must be made as to whether criminal negli-
gence is objective or subjective. Second, the extra degree of
negligence requisite for criminal liability must be defined.
Although frequent references to the "ordinary prudent
man" will be found in the cases, 5 2 judges have not faced the
first problem frankly Civil negligence is objective as far as
possible.5 53 It has been the thesis of this study that criminal
negligence, except in the case of murder,55 4 is also objective. This
theory is best expressed by the phrase so often used in the cases,-
"civil and criminal negligence are the same in kind. '5 55 The
acceptance of the objective view of criminal negligence furnishes
the opportunity to use "the reasonable man," a convenient ob-
jective abstraction, as the norm by which the conduct of the
defendant is measured.
A few jurisdictions hold a defendant criminally as well as
civilly liable if he has failed to conform to the conduct of the
reasonable man considering the circumstances in the particular
case. 5 56 However, most jurisdictions require a higher degree of
negligence to establish criminal liability than is required in civil
cases.5 57 This presents the second major problem in criminal
negligence, that of defining the extra degree of negligence requi-
site for criminal liability
The following formula for criminal negligence has been sug-
gested -558
(1) Criminal negligence is conduct creating such an unreason-
able risk of harm to life, safety, property or other interest
for the unintentional invasion of which the law prescribes
punishment, as to be recklessly disregardful of such interest.
The standard of conduct to be applied is that of a reasonable
man under like circumstances.
'See, supra, fn. 106.
See, supra, p. 172, fn. 299.
See the discussion, supra, pp. 139-155.
See, supra, p. 27 and fn. 108.
SSee the discussion, supra, pp. 10-20. See also, supra, pp.
246-247.
M7 See, supra, p. 9, fn. 31.
' See, supra, p. 31.
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(2) Criminally negligent conduct may be either:
(a) An act which the actor as a reasonable man should real-
ize as involving under the circumstances a reckless dis-
regard of an interest of others, or
(b) A failure to perform a legal duty which the actor as a
reasonable man should realize amounts to a reckless
disregard for human life and safety under the circum-
stances.
This formula ties up civil and criminal negligence, using as
far as possible the language in the Restatement of Torts as the
common measure of expression. Since civil and criminal negli-
gence are the same in kind, differing only in degree, there are
distinct advantages in such common statement. It facilitates
their development along parallel lines, so far as that is expedient,
and makes studies and judicial opinions in either field of sub-
stantial value in the other.
The formula brings to the surface the two problems which
have been mentioned as the most important ones in criminal negli-
gence. The first of these is presented by the enunciation that
negligence is "conduct," an objective view of the offense, the
second by the description of the "higher degree" of negligence
necessary for criminal liability as conduct creating such an un-
reasonable risk of harm as to be "recklessly disregardful of an
interest of others."
Of course, the concepts, "conduct" and "recklessly disre-
gardful", must be broken down in order that they may be applied
to individual cases. The abstract statement of a formula is only
the first step in a process. With that in mind, several devices
have been suggested for breaking down the formula and describ-
ing criminal negligence so that those who have the duty of apply-
ing the definition to the facts of particular cases can do so intelli-
gently 559 In addition, the importance of the "circumstances of
the case" in the determination of negligence has been stressed.
Under this phrase, the "reasonable man" is endowed with
the very qualities of the individual whose conduct is being meas-
ured and he is placed, as nearly as possible, in the very same
objective circumstances that the actor occupied when the injury
occurred. If the objective circumstances created an unusually
dangerous situation, he must have exercised a degree of care com-
mensurate with the danger. If he is an unusually abnormal in-
' See, supra, pp. 127-139.
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dividual, some allowance will be made for that fact. The law has
catalbogued a number of these "unusual circumstances," objective
and subjective, and worked out rules concerning them. These
have been considered in some detail.560
It is now concluded, that criminal negligence can be de-
scribed with practically the same degree of clarity that the courts
attain in describing civil negligence. This study, modeled as far
as possible on the framework devised by the law for the descrip-
tion of civil negligence, shows that it is possible to describe the
criminal offense in almost equal detail. Of course, the law deals
with one of its most difficult problems in describing negligence,
civil or criminal. Taking that fact into consideration, the descrip-
tion of civil negligence is generally believed to be reasonably ade-
quate for the needs of judges and juries." 61 It is believed that a
sinilar conclusion can be made in the case of criminal negligence.
This is true also as to the legislative phase of the problem.
Modern statutes dealing with criminally negligent conduct are
largely declaratory of the common law and therefore subject to
the criticisms commonly leveled at the common law definitions of
negligent offenses. But this need not be. The model murder and
manslaughter provisions which have been submitted562 show that
statutes can be drawn which describe negligent crimes with rea-
sonable precision.
However, it must not be concluded that further development
is not needed. The law of negligence, civil and criminal, is still
largely uncrystallized and one may expect continued improvement
in statement and in the substantive law
See supra, pp. 155-188.
'Cf. Green, The Negligence Issue, supra note 97.
r_ See pp. 238 and 242 supra.
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INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Since the negligence issue may be raised procedurally by
demurrer or by appropriate motions several times in the trial of a
criminal case based upon the offense, 56 3 the adequacy of the
definition and description of criminal negligence is tested several
times in each proceeding.
Such procedural problems put the negligence issue directly
to the judge and he cannot shift his responsibility to the jury
For such duties the law must provide him with a "working de-
scription" of what criminal negligence is. In the case of the
instructions, however, the judge has an additional task. Not only
must he know what negligence is, he must be able to describe it so
that the jury, a body of laymen, can understand what it is and
determine whether the defendant is guilty of it under the facts
of the particular case. Consequently, the instructions provide
a particularly good medium for determining whether the formula
for criminal negligence and the devices provided for breaking it
down are reasonably adequate.
The case of State v Tucker5 64 was appealed because of al-
leged error m the instructions. The defendant, a boy apparently
about twelve years of age, got his father's pistol out of the bureau
and was "projecting" around with it in a room occupied by the
deceased, a boy ten years of age, his sister, and one or two other,
smaller children. The defendant playfully snatched a dime from
the pocket of his sister, and she tried to recover it, whereupon he
said to her, "If you don't sit down I am going to shoot you." The
sister sat down and then the deceased tried to take the money from
the defendant who told him that if he did not sit down he was
going to shoot him. Deceased said, "No, you won't either." The
defendant replied, "If you don't believe it, hold out your hand, I
will show you." The deceased held out his hand, then snatched
it back. Shortly afterwards the pistol was discharged striking
the deceased in the neck, killing him. The defendant immediately
cried out, "Lord have mercyI Did I shoot him '2" and, being
frightened, ran off for a couple of hours. Ie testified at the trial
a See the discussion, supra, pp. 21-25.
86 S.C. 211, 68 S.E. 523 (1910)
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that he was sitting down rubbing the pistol and that the deceased
was sitting by his side and that without knowing that the gun was
loaded or that the deceased had moved in front of him, he pulled
the trigger without meaning to do so.
In describing the negligence requisite for manslaughter, the
court gave the following charge to the jury .565
"Where a person handles firearms in a criminally careless way
and causes the death of some person, he would be guilty of man-
slaughter. Now, it is necessary for me to define to you what we mean
by carelessness or negligence. Negligence is the want of due care;
it is the failure to observe due care under the circumstances; or I
might put it this way it is the failure to do that which a person of
ordinary firmness and reason would have done under the circum-
stances, or it is doing something that a person of ordinary care and
prudence would not have done under the same circumstances."
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter50 6 and ap-
pealed contending that the instruction in effect charged that
criminal negligence was to be determined by the standard of
simple negligence, whereas the court should have charged that the
criminal negligence required for manslaughter is such lack of care
as amounts to recklessness or gross negligence. The court, relying
u-pon a previous decision in the state, held, however, that the m-
struction was not erroneous, since one who causes the death of
another by the negligent use of a pistol or gun is guilty of man-
slaughter, unless the negligence is so wanton as to make the killing
murder.
It would appear that the instruction given by the lower court
employed the tort standard of care. However, although the
method of statement is unfortunate, it is possible that the lower
court intended to instruct and the appellate court to affirm that
the want of ordinary care in handling a dangerous instrumental-
ity in the presence of others is gross negligence.567 At any rate
both the instruction and the opinion lack clarity 50S
Assume that the defendant in the Tucker Case is charged
Id. at 524.
The defendant was indicted for murder but convicted of man-
slaughter. It would appear that the facts did not warrant an indict-
ment for murder.
" Such reasoning and method of statement appear in some cases.
See State v Davis, 128 S.C. 265, 122 S.E. 770 (1924) Held v Com.,
183 Ky 209, 208 S.W 772 (1919)
"I It is believed that South Carolina follows the majority rule
requiring gross negligence in criminal cases, although the -decisions
in that jurisdiction are not clear. See the discussion, supra, pp. 11-13,
and, particularly, fn. 47.
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with manslaughter and that the judge desires to instruct the jury
as to the kind and degree of negligence requisite for the offense in
a jurisdiction which has repudiated the tort standard of care in
criminal cases. Since the charge is only manslaughter, the judge
is not faced with the problem of describing the degree of negli-
gence requisite for murder. Omitting those portiong of -the in-
structions which are not pertinent, he might charge as follows
"Gentlemen of the Jury
"2. You are further instructed that the words, 'criminal negli-
gence' as used in these instructions, mean conduct which is recklessly
disregardful of the interests of others. In determining whether or
not the defendant was guilty of criminal negligence, you should con-
sider the dangerous character of the firearm handled by the defendant,
and also the fact that the defendant was a boy twelve years of age,
together with all the other circumstances of the case.
"You are instructed that the burden is on the state to show beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, nothwithstanding his youth,
had the capacity to understand and realize the danger in handling
firearms.
This instruction has the advantage of brevity It is not er-
roneous since it correctly describes criminal negligence and does
so, probably, sufficiently, as a matter of law Briefly, it tells the
jury that criminal negligence is the eqLuvalent of recklessness.
Recklessness itself is not defined, although the jurv is told that the
dangerous character of the instrumentality used, the defendant's
youth, and the other circumstances of the case are factors in
determining whether the defendant was guilty of it.
The question now arises whether the judge should break the
law down further for the jury Would the jury, as a practical
matter, be aided materiallv by an instruction worded substan-
tiallv as follows-?
"2. I will now charge as to criminal negligence. Negligence, in
the law is the failure to exercise the care that a 'reasonable man' would
have exercised under the circumstances. Of course, the reasonable
man is a fiction, an assumed 'average person, the community ideal
of reasonable behavior. If the defendant's conduct did not meet that
standard he would be civilly liable.
"However, in order to convict the defendant of a crime, his negli-
gence must be greater than the negligence required for civil liability
The law expresses this by saying that criminal negligence is the same
as civil in kind, but greater in degree. This greater degree of negli-
gence required for criminal liability may be described as conduct which
is 'recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.' In other words,
criminally negligent conduct is reckless conduct. Conduct becomes
reckless when it involves a risk to others which is not merely in excess
of its utility but is out of all proportion thereto.
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"I will give you an additional test of criminal negligence. Civil
negligence leads, of course, to compensation by the negligent party.
But to establish criminal liability the negligence of the accused must
be such as to go beyond a mere matter of compensation between parties.
In other words before the defendant can be guilty his conduct must go
so far beyond civil liability as to deserve punishment.
"I have told you that the defendant's conduct is to be judged by
the 'circumstances. One of the circumstances in this case to be
taken into consideration is the fact that the accused is about twelve
years of age. There is a presumption that a child twelve years of
age lacks the mental capacity to commit crime. You are to determine,
therefore, whether the prosecution has shown beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant had the capacity to understand the nature
and consequences of the act he is alleged to have committed and a
knowledge that his conduct was wrong and unlawful (if he did com-
mit the act alleged)
"The external circumstances of the case will also be taken into
consideration by you. Since the care required in a particular case
is proportional to the danger, the actor must exercise a high degree
of care if he is using a dangerous agency Firearms are a dangerous
agency and a high degree'of care is demanded of those who use them,
particularly where other persons are in the immediate vicinity. You
will consider not only these but all the other circumstances in the
case. The importance of none of them can be properly estimated except
in relation to the others.
This instruction is considerably longer than the other, but it
is also, at least from a lawyer's viewpoint, much clearer. "Reck-
less disregard" is broken down and its meaning, as used in the
instruction, is explained. The description, however, is a technical
one, one that lawyers would understand. Although the language
is simple, laymen, perhaps, would not understand it, or refuse to
take the time to consider it carefully, and, consequently would
apply their own individual concepts of what recklessness is. If
that were so, the first instruction would suit the purpose as well
as the second.
Suppose, however, the judge desires to go even further and
to describe the negligence requisite for manslaughter in still
greater detail. If so, he might instruct as follows
"Gentlemen of the Jury
"2. It is now necessary for me to explain what criminal negli-
gence is. Criminal negligence may be defined as follows:
(1) Criminal negligence is conduct creating such an unreas-
onable risk of harm to life, safety, property or other in-
terest for the unintentional invasion of which the law
prescribes punishment, as to be recklessly disregardful
of such interest. The standard of conduct to be applied
is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.
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(2) Criminally negligent conduct may be either:
(a) An act which the actor as a reasonable man should
realize as involving under the- circumstances a reck-
less disregard of an interest of others, or
(b) A failure to perform a legal duty which the actor
as a reasonable man should realize amounts to a
reckless disregard for human life and safety under
the circumstances.
"I will now try to make this definition clear. Negligence in the law
is conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of harm. In determining
what is an unreasonable risk under the facts of a particular case the
law has chosen the conduct of 'a reasonable man' as the standard in
both civil and criminal cases. There is no such actual person, of course.
The reasonable man is a fiction, an assumed 'average person,' the
community ideal of reasonable behavior. One way to apply the standard
is to ask yourselves what such a reasonable man in the community,
would have done under the circumstances. If the defendant's conduct
does not meet that standard, he would be civilly liable.
"However, in order to convict the defendant of a crime, his negli-
gence must be greater than the negligence required for civil liability
The law expresses this by saying that criminal negligence is the same
as civil in kind, but greater in degree. To illustrate, suppose that negli-
gent conduct were measured on an ordinary yardstick. After the place
on the yardstick corresponding to the amount of dangerous conduct
required for civil liability is reached, it will be necessary to move an
appreciable distance farther along the stick to mark the place where
criminal liability begins.
"The formula I have given you describes this 'higher degree' of
negligence which is required for criminal liability by calling it conduct
which is 'recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.' In other
words, criminally negligent conduct is reckless conduct. But, you ask,
when does conduct become reckless? What is the meaning of reckless-
ness? Well, you have your own understanding of the meaning of the
word, but I will give you some aids to supplement your knowledge of
the concept. The first aid will be in the nature of a definition. A factor
in determining whether the risk is unreasonable in a particular case
is the utility of the act which creates the risk. When the danger to the
interests of others outweighs the utility of the act the risk becomes un-
reasonable and civil liablity for negligence occurs. When conduct is
such that it involves a risk to others which is not merely in excess of
its utility but is out of all proportion thereto, it becomes 'recklessly
disregardful of the interests of others' and criminal liability attaches,
if an injury results therefrom.
"Let me give you a case to illustrate what I mean. Suppose a de-
fendant set an unlabeled box of dynamite caps down in a school yard
without apparently appreciating the risk while he went inside to use
the telephone. Some children found the box and while playing with it
caused the caps to explode killing one of them. Since children of tender
years were wont to use the school yard for play, it will not be denied
that the defendant was negligent. And since a reasonable man would
consider such conduct as creating a high degree of probability of sub-
stantial harm, out of all proportion to its utility, it amounted to reck-
lessness and the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. By a slight
variation of the circumstances in the foregoing case the dividing line
between recklessness and ordinary negligence can be approached.
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Suppose thedefendantjis engaged in digging a well in one corner of
the school yard and, familiar with study hours and playground rules,
knows (1) that the children have been forbidden to play in that part of
the school yard where the work is being done, and (2) that there will
notJ.e any play period for forty-five minutes. He sets the box down
in the restricted area at a time when there are no children around.
knowing that he can be back'ih five minutes. However, in the interim
the teacher of the third grade lets her pupils out to play as a reward
for some task well done. Some of -them violate the rule and play in
the restricted part of the yard where they find the box of caps and one
of them is killed. The defendant in the second illustration may easily
be found guilty of ordinary or civil negligence. To leave an unlabeled
uox of dynamite caps in a public place, unless necessity demands it,
probably creates an unreasonable risk to anyone who could be expected
to come upon them there. Though it was unlikely from the point of view
of anyone in the defendant's position that any child would be injured
by the caps before he returned, still, the fact that schedules of work
and play in public schools are generally known to be quite elastic,
coupled with the fact that children -are known to frequently violate
playground regulations, plus the fact that the injury if any child did
come in contact with the box might be very serious, would almost cer-
tainly brand the defendant's conduct as negligent. However, it could
hardly be said that his act involved such a high degree of probability of
substantial harm as to create liability for manslaughter. Remember,
this is not the case you are deciding but just an illustration to help
you understand the difference between civil and criminal negligence.
Other illustrations could be given, also.
"I will give you one additional test of criminal negligence. Civil
negligence leads, of course, to compensation by the negligent party.
But to establish criminal liability the negligence of the accused must
be such as to go beyond a mere matter of compensation between
parties. It must show 'such disregard for the life and safety of others
as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving punish-
ment. In other words, before the defendant can be guilty his conduct
must go so far beyond civil liability as to deserve punishment.
"Let me call your attention to another phrase in the formula. You
are to test the conduct of the defendant by what a reasonable man
would have done 'under the circumstances. In other words, you are
to put the reasonable man, who is your standard for measuring the
conduct of the defendant, under the same circumstances, as nearly as
possible, as the defendant when he committed the act (if he did com-
mit it) which is alleged to have been criminally negligent. His age is
one of the 'circumstances' in the case. There is a presumption that
a child twelve years of age lacks the mental capacity to commit
crime. Therefore the burden of showing that he has the capacity is
upon the prosecution in this case. You are to determine from the
evidence whether the prosecution has shown, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant had the capacity to understand the nature
and consequences of the act he is alleged to have committed and a
knowledge that his conduct was wrong and unlawful (if he did com-
mit the act alleged)
"There are certain objective circumstances in the case which you
will also take into consideration in determining whether the defendant
was criminally negligent as charged. The nature of the instrumentality
being used by the defendant when the alleged injury occurred is one
of the most important circumstances to be taken into consideration.
This is because the kind of instrumentality used by the actor has a
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great deal to do with the degree of danger which his conduct creates.
X handles a cane negligently in a crowded room. There is little
danger to human life and safety But if he had handled a sword
negligently in the same room the risk of harm would have been in-
creased many times. Since the care required in a particular case is
proportional to the danger, the actor must exercise a high degree of
care if he is using a dangerous agency Firearms are a dangerous
agency and a high degree of care is demanded of those who use them,
particularly where other persons are in the immediate vicinity
"In closing this part of my instructions to you, it is well to empha-
size that each, separate factor is but one of the circumstances in the
case. The importance of none of them can be properly estimated except
in its relation to the others.
This instruction, a lengthy one, employs not only definitions
but illustrations m describing the negligence requisite for man-
slaughter. It is believed that the judge has not invaded the
province of the jury in using the illustrations since they are not
based upon the facts in the case and the jury is warned that they
are used for illustrative purposes. The lawyer would find this
instruction clearer than either of the others and it would seem
that a jury composed of laymen would also, all things considered,
if they had the time and inclination to consider it carefully This
raises the whole question of the nature and extent of the instruc-
tions that should be given to the jury, a difficult problem in itself.
The various instructions are given, not as models, but, as indi-
cating, progressively, the means available to the judge for de-
scribing criminal negligence to the jury
